Полное описание

Horniacek, M. Cooperation and Efficiency in Markets / by Milan Horniacek. - Electronic text data. - Berlin ; Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer,, 2011. - (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, ISSN 0075-8442 ; vol. 649). - URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19763-5. - Загл. с экрана. - ISBN 978-3-642-19763-5. - DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-19763-5. - Текст : электронный.
Содержание:
Introduction -- Model -- Existence of an SRPE and an SSPE -- Efficiency of an SRPE and an SSPE -- Afterword.

ГРНТИ	УДК
06.56.21	339.13

Рубрики:
game theory
economic theory
microeconomics
industrial organization
economic policy
economics
economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
industrial Organization
economic Policy
microeconomics
game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav Sciences

Аннотация: The book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept that we apply. It requires that no coalition of players in no subgame can weakly Pareto improve the vector of continuation average discounted payoffs of its members by a deviation. If the sum of firms' average discounted profits is maximized along the equilibrium path then the equilibrium output of each type of good is produced with the lowest possible costs. If, in addition, all buyers are retailers (i.e., they resell the goods purchased in the analyzed market in a retail market) then the equilibrium vector of the quantities sold in the retail market is sold with the lowest possible selling costs. We specify sufficient conditions under which collusion increases consumer welfare.

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